Terrorism in India

Dr. Bobinder

Abstract

The research paper focus on the in titled of terrorism in India. In this paper show that the main problem of terrorism in India. India is a developing country in this world, so terrorism is a term used in its broadest sense to describe the use of intentionally indiscriminate violence as a means to create terror or fear, in order to achieve a political, religious or ideological aim. It is used in this regard primarily to refer to violence against civilians or non-combatants. Although the term has been in use since at least the 1970s, it initially became popular when journalists and politicians publicly introduced and started using the term "Islamic terrorists" following the September 11 attacks. Rather than being used to describe a type of activity, the term has often been used politically as a term of abuse or denunciation, both by non-state groups and by governments against each other. There is no universally agreed upon definition of the term, and many definitions exist.

Broad categories of political organisations have been claimed to have been involved in terrorism in order to further their objectives, including right-wing and left-wing political organisations, nationalist groups, religious groups, revolutionaries and ruling governments. The symbolism of terrorism has been said to exploit human fear to help them achieve these goals. Terrorism-related legislation has been adopted in various Western states such as the UK, Canada and the US since the September 11 attacks, regarding "terrorism" as a crime, however there is no universal agreement as to whether or not terrorism can be regarded as a war crime.

Introduction

The words terrorism, insurgency, civil war, revolution, guerrilla war, intimidation and extremism are most often interchanged and used very loosely. What is common in all is 'violence'. Terrorism is an organized system of intimidation. It is also defined as 'a method whereby an organized group or party seeks to achieve its avowed aims chiefly through the systematic use of violence' *(Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences)*. The US Central Intelligence Agency's 1980 definition of it, duly accepted by the State Department is: "The threat or use of violence for political purposes by individuals or groups, whether acting for or in opposition, when such actions are intended to shock, stun, or intimidate a target group wider than the immediate victims"*(The Hindustan Times, January 15, 1996).*

Terrorist acts are directed against persons who, as individual agents or representatives of authority, interfere with the consummation of the objectives of such a group. A 'terrorist' is one who imposes the punishment meted out by his organization upon those who are held to interefere with the revolutionary programme. The terrorist does not merely threaten; death or destruction is part of his programme of action. If he is arrested, he does not try to prove his innocence but he spreads his doctrines. Through the long-term objectives of terrorism, insurgency and revolution are similar, that is, overthrow of the existing regime or order, but the short-term objec tives and strategies or methodology may be quite different.

Terrorism is different from 'mob violence also. The latter is unplanned and uncontrolled, guided by some immediate motivation which may not even be rational and is not based on any precise programme. The former has a definite goal and is planned. It aims at demoralizing a governmental authority and undermining its power. However, at times, terrorism may also use mob violence as its method. The difference between terrorism and insurgency is that an insurgent has the support of a large section of the local population while a terrorist need not have such support. Again, an insurgent is a national of a country which is in revolt against the constitutional government of his country and fights to overthrow the

government by guerrilla warfare. The terrorist may or may not be a national of the country in which he operates **(Saxena, 1985: 14-35)**

The above definitions enable us to put forth six basic definitional components of terrorism. The include : (1) terror purpose (that is, creating fear in the minds of the primary target), (2) instrumental or immediate victims, (3) primary targets (population or broad groups and others), (4) an outcome of death to instrumental targets and damage to or destruction of property, (5) violence, and (6) political purpose.

Terrorism in Punjab

Sikh terrorism in Punjab was based not on "grievance situation, " but on "identity crisis of Sikhs, " or on the idea of a "theocratic state" through secession and partition of the country. It (terrorism) entered a dangerous phase in 1984-85. Earlier during 1982-83, scores of innocent people, mostly Hindus were killed in a reckless spree. In the later phase, along with Hindus, Sikhs were also killed . Places of worship were turned by the militants into arsenals. There were not only many transistor bombblasts in Delhi,. Haryana and Uttar Pradesh which took a heavy toll of life but there were consipracies also to kill VIPs. Sant Longowal, President of the Akali Dal, was murdered inside a gurdwara in August 1985, while the **Chief Minister of Punjab** was killed by a human bomb in his car in 1995.

The massacre of selected non-Sikh passengers travelling by bus, blowing up the Air India Boeing 'Kanishka' and killing nearly 300 innocent Indians, the murder of 11,543 political leaders, journalists, and even innocent people, and of 1667 cops between 1984 and 1992, the killing of 114 Hindu 1991, the looting of banks both in and outside Punjab, the killing of 24 candidates contesting elections in June 1991 (later postponed of February 1992) at the rate of one candidate a day, were all acts of terrorists highly condemned by everybody. The death toll in Punjab, including that of civilians, security forces and militants between 1981 and 1993 is shown in Table 2.

The imperialist forces interested in balkanzing India and in weakening, destablizing and even disintegrating our country, had been supporting, encouraging and abetting the demand of Khalistan. The internal factor which helped the terrorists in Punjab was the spread of Hindu communalism. The Hindu communalists held the entire Sikh community responsible for the crimes of terrorists. They kept on harping on the slogan of revenge and retaliation. Their (communalists') assertion that Sikhs are Hindus provided the argument to the separatists that unless there is Khalistan, Sikhism will be absorbed in the Hindu religion. Gandhi had resulted in killing of more than 300 Sikhs. The fact that no action was taken against those who were involved in these riots was expolited by the extremists in Punjab to spread terrorism and gather mass support for their action.

Table 1 : Killings in Punjab 1981-1993

Persons killed by terrorists	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Hindus	10	8	35	237	45	324	425	858	442	743	744	-	-
Sikhs	3	5	40	122	17	196	478	1044	734	1694	1874	-	-
Total	13	13	75	359	62	520	903	1949	1176	2437	2618	1519	45
Cops killed by terrorists	2	2	20	20	8	42	95	110	152	493	496	251	23
Terrorists killed	14	7	13	77	2	78	328	373	699	1324	2177	2109	748
Terrorists arrested	84	178	296	1630	491	1581	3750	3882	2466	1759	1949	1473	898
Encounters	0	5	3	80	20	109	410	416	582	706	1282	1389	527

Source: The Hindustan Times, January 21, 1996.

The strategies and tactics adopted by the Khalistan- oriented terrorists were: (i) undermining the authority of the administration by issuing (ii) projecting themselves as the defender of Sikhs and Sikh religion, (iii) killing innocent people, looting banks and shops and creating terror, (iv) forcing the Hindus of Punjab to migrate to other states and providing opportunities to Sikhs from other states to migrate to Punjab, and (v) developing a nexus with smugglers for raising funds in Punjab.

After the measures adopted by the government and the police between March 1993 and March 1994, terrorism in Punjab has now almost been controlled, though there still exist some Sikhs groups that keep on asking for separate Sikhs state. The killing of the Chief Minister of Punjab and 15 others in a bomb-blast on August 31, 1995, was described by some people as returning of the ghosts of Punjab's terrifying past. Some people feel that the train explosion near Ambala of Jhelam Express going to Jammu on December 2, 1996 which killed 12 people and injured 31 people is a pointer to the return of terrorism in Punjab. Others se3e it as a renewed ISI initiative to revive militancy both in Punjab and Kashmir. But there are other people who contend that terrorism in Punjab and Kashmir. But there are other people who contend that terrorism in Punjab cannot re-erupt. Today, the spirit of the people in Punjab has been fatigued by terrorism. There is no anger but just a gnawing fear that has become a state of mind. In 'Babey Raj' (the local parlance for militants), the people had internalized fear and had learnt to live with it. The word of the terrorists was like a command for the villagers. The poor villagers followed these commands for the sake of their safety, for the safety of their children, for the safety of their fields, and for the safety of their cattle, shops and property. The agony of people in Punjab was that not only had the terrorists progressively held the state to ransom but the administration by its corrupt tentacles had destroyed the faith of the people in the system and the highhandedness of the police raj seemed to grow by leaps and bounds. In the face of such anarchy, the people's anguish was silenced.

The Naxalite Terrorism

The Naxalite terrorism appeared in West Bengal in 1967. It got impetus in 1969 when CPI (ML) was born at the instigation from China which was interested in weakening India. The theoretical backing for Naxalite thought came from the Ninth Congrtess of the Communist Party of China held in April 1969, when Mao's thoughts were declared to be the highest stage of Marxism-Leninism. Using these thoughts, the Naxalite leader, Charu Mazumdar had declared "China's Chairman is our Chairman". From West Bengal, the Naxalite movement spread to Bihar to fight for the landless labour. However, Charu Mazumdar's call for annihilation of class enemies did not get much response from the peasanty class and the educated middle class, though many idealistic young Naxalite men and women enjoyed killing landlords, moneylenders and police officers. Between 1969 and 1972, about two thousand persons were killed and there were 700 cases of looting and 9000 acts of other violence by the Naxalites. The police killed about 400 and arrested about 6000 terrorists. The movement also got discredited because professional criminals joined the movement. After 1972, the Naxalite movement spread from West Bengal and Bihar to Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Orissa, Tamil Nadu, and Tripura. The situation in Andhra Pradesh and Bihar between 1988 and 1997 has been much worse. The exploited poor and the tribals continue to follow Naxalite terrorism for protecting themselves from ex-zamindars, money lenders, and other exploiters. The government deals with this Naxalite terrorism purely as a problem of law and order.

Terrorism in Kashmir

India has been faced with the Kashmir problem for the past half a century and has even faced two Indo-Pakistan wars on this issue, but the government has not been able to take hard decisions and evolve a definite coherent policy. Out policy makers have been chasing the mirage of soft options and have been following a weak-kneed approach in dealing with the terrorists. Terrorism in Kashmir assumed a new shape 1988 onwards. The militants launched a bloody battle to underline their separate identity. The neighbouring countries, determined to see turmoil continuing in the valley, are providing training and weapons to the militants even today (i.e., in 1997). The people have also been so brain-washed that they talk of the excesses of the police and the para-military forces. For the militants, the criticism of the government by the people means that people are more than willing to suppolrt them. On the other hand, the Hindus have been forced by the militants to leave Kashmir. It is claimed in one report that nearly two

lakh Hindus fled Jammu and Kashmir between 1988 and 1991. The Hindus claimed that the fundamentalists and militants had infiltrated every sphere of the government in the Kashmir valley till the middle of 1996 and that what ruled the roost was not the writ till the middle of 1996 and that what ruled the roost was not the pro-Pakistan forces had overtaken the valley and in a way, there was a collapse of the administration and the terrorists wanted them to quit the valley. The civilian Muslims now claim that they are innocent and are being unnecessarily harassed. The militants had resorted to extortion and kidnapping for monetary gains and political motives. In October-November 1993, 40-odd militants (including three foreigners) were holed up inside Hazratbal shrine for 31 days. They had kept 20 civilians too as their hostages. In July 1995, the militant group of Al-Faran kidnapped five foreigners (British, American, Norwegian, Gernman) and kept them captives, demanding the release of some hard-core militants. After beheading a Norwegian national hostage after a few weeks, the Al-Faran have held the remaining four tourists captive for about two years keeping the governments guessing as to whether the hostages are still alive or not. There is no dearth of weapons in the Valley; nor is there any dearth of frustrated youths to operate them. Hizb-ul-Mujahedeen was claimed to have a cadre strength of 20,000 with at least 10,000 persons being trained in camps across the border and in the Valley. The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) still clings on to the concept of an independent state as opposed to a merger with Pakistan, which is the demand of other militant groups like the Muslim Janpaez Force and the Iqwan-e-Musalmeen. All militants at one time had developed a feeling that they had to unite against a common enemy- the Indian Armed Forces.

Some sources claim that till two years ago, Muslims from other countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan Sudan, Libya, Bangladesh, Lenon, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey were engaged in terrorist activities in Kashmir (India Today; May 15, 1994:45-66). Pakistan's aiding and abetting terrorism in Kashmir is said to be the deliberate policy of the government. It (Pakistan) considers liberation of Kashmir important in three respects: firstly, tension over Kashmir creates a diversion from frustrations at home; secondly, the Kashmir cause allows Pakistan to rally the support of its Islamic parties and their loyalists in the military and the ISI; thirdly, Kashmir could also serve the regime as an important access-point to the markets of Central Asia. No wonder, Pakistan always remains interested in an excalation of the jihad for the liberation of Kashmir.

The kidnapping and killing of the Vice-Chancellor of Kashmir University, the kidnapping of a daughter of Union Home Minister in 1989, two Swedish engineers in April 1991 (who ultimately managed to escape on July 6, 1991), eight Israeli tourists in June 1991 and five foreign tourists in July 1995 indicate the strategies the terrorists are employing. The strategy used to combat terrorism in Punjab cannot succeed in Kashmir. The government might have succeeded in fighting terrorism in Punjab with a policy of "wear them out", negotiations, elections, and police action but Punjab problem was different from the Kashmir problem in four respects: one, the idea of Khalistan did not enjoy universal backing; two, there was ethno-religious advantage of having 48 percent Hindu population against 52 percent Sikh population whereas in Kashmir 90 percent are Muslims, with most Hindus having been 'cleansed' over the last three years; three, the foreign interference in Kashmir is of a qualitatively different level than in Punjab. Pakistani training and weapon proliferation to the terrorist elements in Kashmir is of far greater proportions; four most of the indidivuals and organizations in Punjab were fence-sitters waiting to be co-opted by the government whereas the organization working in Kashmir mostly consist of pro-Pakistani extremists.

Some people believe that during the last one and a half year, the chemistry of terrorism in Kashmir has undergone a major change. The modus operandi of the militants has now been drastically altered. Instead of using the local militants, militants from Pakistan and Afghanistan are being more and more used in terrorist activities in the state. The savage car bomb blasts in

the heart of Srinagar and killing of one journalist and seriously injuring others through a letter bomb at the BBC's Srinagar office in September 1995, and the kidnapping of tourists from the western countries, indicate a significant change in methods, means and motives which required a fresh thinking on the part of the newly elected state government. Besides the military strategy, political, economic, and cultural strategies too have to be used in combating Kashmir uprisings. The bridges of trust have to be built by far-sighted political initiatives.

ULFA Terrorism

Terrorism in Assam emerged from 1980 onwards. Assamese already had raised the issue of removing foreigners and deleting their names from the electoral rolls. When the government failed to take action, there were agitations in February 1983 elections in which 5,000 persons lost their lives. After the AASU movement when the Assam Gana Parishad (AGP) came to power in 1986, it was felt that the State would develop. But the factions soon led to the split of the AGP. The United Minorities front (UMF) and the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) emerged as two miulitant organization. The all Bodo Students' Union (ABSU) also demanded a separate state resulting in considerable violence. The ULFA stepped up its campaign of murder, loot and kidnapping. Theterrorist activities spread panic not only among the non-Assamese but also amongst the Assamese people. The army action-named Operation Bajrang-against the secessionist militant organization subdued it to the extent that the militant activities did not interfere even with the elections in June 1991. It was hoped that the formation of the new Congress government in June 1991 would rout or weaken organizations like the ULFA Bodo Security Force, and the ASDC and that the new government would be able to contain the terrorist activities of the militant organizations in the state. But the abduction of persons from different parts of the state and the killing and the looting of the people belied these expectations. The eight-year Bodoland movement was expected to end in 1994 when the Bodo Peoples' Action Committee (BPAC) and the All Bodo Students Union (ABSU) agreed to accept a Bodoland Autonomous Council within the state of Assam. This Council (of 40 members) was to have full autonomy to make the development plans relating to 38 specified subjects and jurisdiction over roughly 15,000 sq. km spread over seven districts of Assam. However, the continuing of Bodo agitations in 1995, 1996 and even in 1997 indicates that the agreement between the government and the Bodos has not borne the expected fruit. Even the new AGP government and the Bodos has not borne the expected fruit. Even the new AGP government that came in power in 1996 has failed to contain the ethnic violence.

Besides the above-mentioned political aspect of terrorism (in Punjab, kashmir, Assam, etc.) in India, it has one more aspect too, what may be called the 'Islamic aspect'. India is the only major power that is the odd-man-out amidst the 'Islamic Crescent' that stretches from Saudi Arabia to Indonesia. A product of the 1970 and the late Pakistan's Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto's talk of 'Islami Bomb', this phenomenon resurged with the Iranian Revolution. The Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union and of the communist ideology in Eastern Europe have been the recent landmarks. If these developments ended the financial support, weapons and safehavens to anti-west groups (like the Palestinians), they also market the emergence of 'de-ideologized' Central Asian republics. For the South Asian region, the coming of Central Asian nations under the religio-cultural influence of Turkey and Iran and Saudi-backed attempts by Pakistan to reach them militarily, are new developments. The support of Islamic countries to Kashmiri terrorists is based on this ideology.

Besides Punjab, Kashmir and Assam, the activities of the terrorists are sometimes spread to other states also. For example in March 1993, the terrorists killed 235 and injured 1200 persons through eleven bombblasts in Mumbai (Bombay). In similar bomb-blasts in Calcutta in March 1993, 86 persons were killed. Such bomb-blasts, kidnappings for ransom, looting of banks etc., by the terrorists are many a time reported in other states too.

Theoretical Explanation of Causes of Terrorism

Following Gurr (1977), the causes of terrorism may be explained on the basis of the Theory of Relative Deprivation. According to this theory, political collective violence may be described as a consequence of gap developing between the value expectations of a given group of people and the value capabilities of the group.

The Israeli Model

Terrorism in Israel has been prevailing for the last four decades. Initially, for about one and a half decades (1953 to 1967), the Palestinians living in the west of Jordan and in the Gaza strip carried out their resistance through cross border raids by sneaking into Israel. The Israelis responded by carrying out airborne raids and by intruding into Jordan and destroying Palestinian camps with tanks. Since these attacks caused extnsive damage to Jordanian army and property, the public opinion in Jordan turned against supporting the PLO. Along with Jordan, other Arab counties also prevented the PLO from carrying out its activities from their soil. Jordan launched a purge in September 1970 against the Palestinians and killed about 15,000 of them. The PLO base in Lebanon also was eliminated when Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982. Israel, thus, dealt with the PLO terrorists by eliminating their bases. The Palestinians then adopted the tactics of hijacking Israeli civilian aircrafts and also kidnapping the Israeli civilians and demanding the release of their jailed colleagues in Israel. The Israeli government never yielded to such terrorist threats and in retaliation attacked the Palestinian camps. Though the Israeli policy of non-negotiation with the terrorists was often criticized but Israel never budged from its position, maintaining that once they gave into hijackings and kidnappings, they would multiply manifold. Thus, the four primary components of the Israeli strategy in dealing with terrorist violence are: (1) refusal to negotiate with terrorists, (2) retaliatory raids on the bases of terrorists, (3) strict security measures, and (4) covert violence against Palestinians (even innocent) connected with terrorists and sympathizers of Palestinians. Thus, the Israeli model of combating terrorism is based on 'counter-terror' and 'anti-terror' rather than passive defensive measures.

The American Model

The United States has global economic interests and is vulnerable to terrorism. The most potent weapon of America to fight terrorism-has been its fails, the U.S. bombs the enemy country supporting terrorists. This leader Col. Gaddafi supported terrorist movements like those of the PLO of the terrorist gangs in Latin America. The same method was adopted by America when it invaded Cambodia for giving shelter to Vietcong during the Vietnam war. Thus, the American model of combating terrorism was 'counter terror campaign' and invasion.

The Indian Model

India has been facing severe problems of violence and terrorism since the 1960sx. The insurgency in the north-east in the 1960s and the 1970s was tackled by the government more through political methods. The violence in Jammu and Kashmir also falls more into the category of insurgency rather than pure terroriszm. Operation Blue Star of the military on June 6, 1984, in Punjab and 'Operation Black Thunder' in Assam designed to counter terrorism totally failed. They were anti-terrorist measures (implemented mainly through the police forces and partially through the military forces) rather than counter trrorist measures. The hallmark of the policies in the former measures are: frequent road checks, sentries at which supply the bulk of arms, or give shelter to terrorists or finance terrorism have not been called to account., Even there, the emphasis is on passive measures like border fencing or lodging mild protests. No wonder, that even after 30 years India has not been able to control terrorism. The government in most cases succumbs to the demands of the terrorists as happened in Kashmir, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar.

Thus, the three models (Israeli, American and Indian) of combating terrorism are different in content as well as in temperament. In a way, they reflect the power of the states.

The American model is 'counter-terror' model which is based on hitting at the very roots of terrorist support. The India model is anti-terrorist model. The Israeli model is "blend of counter-terror and anti-terrorist measures". The terrorist menace cannot be eliminated either through anti-terror or counter-terror approaches. Besides the police and the military measures, the sociopolitical issues have to be tackled. The bases in the countries, at least the neighbouring countries, supporting the terrorists have to be attacked and destroyed. The policy in dealing with such counties has to be deterrent.

The Government of India cannot face the problem of terrorism merely by enlisting public sympathy or by blaming countries of giving support to terrosits. Helping terrorists in a hostile country is a fact of life which no organized government in modern times can ignore. Our country has to evolve its own system of dealing with terrorists.

Some methods which may prove to be helpful to our government in this regard are (Saxena, 1985: 33-34):

- seeking cooperation of the citizens by the police to get information against the terrorists;
- reducing the finance at the disposal of the terrorists to contain their operations;
- refusing to accept any demands of any group of terrorists;
- giving swift and judicial punishments to arrested terrorists. The greater the delay in prosecution and greater the detention in the jail as undertrials, the greater the possibility of their (terrorists) escape;
- adopting more effective intelligence methods in retrieving information about the terrorists, their associates, their modus operandi, and their sources of finance and weapons, etc.
- improving security measures continuously at important places; and
- giving more scientific training to forces dealing with terrorists.

Sociology of Terrorism

How does terrorism disrupt the political system or social organizations? How does terrorism act as a method for hastening social change? How does terrorism explain the social relationship between a frustrated minority and the ruling political elite, or between a group which feels deprived and a group which has the monopoly on the use of force? A holistic sociological perspective of terrorism will be possible only when we discuss large-scale political events not only in aggregate numerical terms but also in impact terms, that is, we focus not only on quantitative macropolitics but also on qualitative micropolitics.

Terrorism demoralizes and demobilizes populations and disintegrates societies, though it is also true that terrorism in some instances serves as an integrative mechanism binding people together in a common cause. Terrorism may involve the problem of law and order, that is, of killing or kidnapping of one group by other group because of its religious affiliations or sub-cultural differences, but it does not disrupt the social systems. Nor is terrorism a special method for hastening historical change. No terrorist movement has ever succeeded in achieving its goals. Terrorists, therefore, do not shape the course of historical events.

For understanding terrorism, it is necessary to measure the amount of violence engaged in by the terrorists to effect their desired ends, the quantum of force utilized by the police and the armed forces to prevent social change, and also to measure the types of violence. Using this persepective to terrorism in India, the number of people killed and kidnapped in Bihar in one year is much more than the killings and kidnappings in Punjab or Kashmir. When a terroist takes a life in the name of social justice, he faces a problem of social accounting at one level and moral constraint at another. One might also speak of the results of the use of terror to overthrow state authority. Suppose we accept the temporary disruption of the normal administrative activities of politico-social systems, do we not face the same results whenever we are faced with any social or natural calamity? Does the killing of one or two, or even a few important political leaders by the terrorists change the structure of politics? By and large, the nature of political process in the society is not interfered with, nor it is interrupted by these

killings. Quantitatively, thus, the killings by terrorists may not be significant but they do involved the qualitative traumas. This is the problem we faced in the assassinations of Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi by the terrorists. As a result, we may not label terrorist activities 'unsuccessful', but at the same time, we cannot viw them as succesful' too in terms of the limited numbers involved. Socioligically, therefore, terrorists may not be able to topple the social order but they do loosen that order symbolically by weakening the legitimating capacities of administrative officials and the power elite. To board an aeroplane, one might agree to get his luggage checked or go through the security measures for approaching an important person; nevertheless, one has a perfect right to raise questions about these new social costs. These symbolic changes as the result of consequences of terroism may be irritable but their transitory nature is invariably important for social evaluation. The social impact of terrorism which may totally affect the society on a long-term basis, thus, should be the central focus in any system of analytic measurement. It may, therefore, be concluded that claaiming that terrorism disintegrates society or affects the survival of the system will not be very correct.

Nevertheless, mechanisms have to be created to prevent acts of terror. Terrorism and political violence have become the bane of Indian society today. Both are leading the country towards anarchy and choas. Terrorists kill in the name of religion and region, in the name of language and culture. It is time that the prevalent frustration and a sense of deprivation amongst people, particularly the youth, be checked. On one hand, the government has to deal with the terrorists with a very firm hand, and on the other the minorities have to be protected and right atmosphere created for the functioning of a genuine democracy. The terrorism of the terrorists of terrorizing the terrorized has to be contained.

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